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ABSTRACT
Data breaches are a modern reality. Plaintiffs sue in the aftermath of a data breach to get
compensation from the party that failed to secure their data. However, plaintiffs often have
trouble satisfying the standing requirement because federal courts rigidly interpret Supreme
Court standing precedent. The Second Circuit’s decision in McMorris v. Carlos Lopez &
Associates, LLC clarified the standing requirement in the data breach context. However, the
test leaves many plaintiffs without legal recourse. It generally only permits plaintiffs to
proceed past the pleading stage when the data was stolen as part of a malicious attack or
misused prior to the suit. The issue is that most data breaches are the result of negligence.
This note explores the limitations of the Second Circuit’s test, and it proposes some
modifications that better account for modern realities. It also analyzes developments in
Supreme Court standing jurisprudence, and how those developments are a welcome sign for
future plaintiffs in the data breach context.
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MALICIOUS V. NEGLIGENT LOSS OF DATA: THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S
QUESTIONABLE TEST TO DETERMINE DATA BREACH STANDING.
LUKASZ KORNAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Data digitalization is a key priority of companies looking to stay competitive in a
digital economy.1 As a result, the digital economy continues to expand at record speeds
as technology advances.2 The digital economy can be defined as “economic activity that
results from billions of everyday online connections among people, businesses, devices,
data, and processes.”3 Digitalization does not only refer to e-commerce,4 but also offers
“diverse digital solutions available for nearly all business functions.” 5 The COVID-19
pandemic served as a major catalyst for a “surge in the use of digital technologies due
to the social distancing norms and nationwide lockdowns.” 6 With the start of economic
recovery in 2021, many companies continue to digitalize with hopes that digitalization
will provide the best returns.7 While there are advantages to digitalization, there are
also risks; one of the greatest risks being a lack of data security.
Companies are increasingly using digital means to store confidential data, which
exposes their data to a greater risk of being unintentionally circulated. The pandemic
* © 2022 Lukasz M. Kornas, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2023, UIC School of Law School; B.A.
in Psychology, University of Illinois Chicago (2019). I want to thank my family, my editor, Jennifer
Armstrong, and the rest of the RIPL staff for their guidance and support. This achievement would not
have been possible without them.
1 Rex Ahlstrom, The Role Of Data In The Age Of Digital Transformation, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/01/17/the-role-of-data-in-the-age-of-digitaltransformation/?sh=766259124509 (because of market trends regarding digitalization, “global
spending on digital transformation technologies and services was expected to increase by nearly 20%
in 2018 to more than $1.1 trillion”).
2
Kosha Gada, The Digital Economy In 5 Minutes, FORBES (June 16, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/koshagada/2016/06/16/what-is-the-digital-economy/?sh=23a712197628.
Half of the population is online because of rapid development of technology. Id. As a result, “[a] young,
dynamic, $3 trillion ecosystem based on technological infrastructure, increasingly intuitive devices
and interfaces, vast audience networks, a whole new medium for advertising and an unlimited supply
of content” is available to users. Id.
3 Heidi Booth, What is the digital economy?, DIGITAL PRESENCE (July 23, 2021),
https://www.hubspace.ca/what-is-the-digital-economy. “UNCTAD found that companies, on average,
reacted to a range of pandemic related factors 20 to 25 time faster than expected. When asked about
their transition to working remotely, the response rate was 40 times faster than prior to the COVID19
crisis.” Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Rahul De, Neena Pandey, & Abhipsa Pal, Impact of digital surge during Covid-19 pandemic: A
viewpoint on research and practice, 55 INT. J. INF. MANAGE. 1, 1-2 (2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7280123.
7
Kumar
Ritesh,
Digital
Risks
In
2021,
FORBES
(Feb.
18,
2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/02/18/digital-risks-in-2021. Many employees
have started to work remotely, and companies have begun to utilize “cloud services and
communication tools hastily” to adopt to the pandemic. As a result, companies are at great risk of data
breaches. Likewise, human errors and insider attacks are also expected to heighten.” Id.
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has taught employers that the biggest threat to ensuring data security is employee
negligence.8 Additionally, companies are not adequately prepared for the ongoing shift
towards digitalization. 9 Companies have few security measures regarding access to
their sensitive files.10 Any employee who has access to data may inadvertently leak
that data. Because data is a valuable asset, the consequences of its leak can be
catastrophic.11
Data breaches occur “when information is accessed, taken, or used by a person
without authorization.”12 Breaches occur for a variety of reasons, but the most common
are criminal activity, employee accidents or negligence, computer failures, or system
failures, and once the data is leaked, it is difficult to minimize the damage.13 Data
breach cases usually result in class action lawsuits in which the plaintiffs allege the
defendants were negligent in developing and maintaining their security measures. 14
However, as it currently stands under Article III jurisprudence, many litigants will
have trouble satisfying the injury-in-fact requirement unless they fall victim to
identity theft or their data is otherwise misused.15 The issue is that victims of a data
breach will naturally seek to protect their information even if the breach was
accidental because someone who received that information, either accidentally or
intentionally, may still abuse it.16

8 Carmen Reinicke, The biggest cybersecurity risk to US businesses is employee negligence, study
says, CNBC (June 21, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/21/the-biggest-cybersecurity-risk-to-usbusinesses-is-employee-negligence-study-says.html:

Cybersecurity practices have not yet caught up. A majority of executives agree that
the risk of a data breach is higher when an employee works remotely, yet few
businesses have comprehensive off-site policies in place for those workers. Over half
of small business owners said they have no policy for remote workers.
9
Varonis,
2019
VARONIS
GLOBAL
DATA
RISK
REPORT,
12
(2019),
https://info.varonis.com/hubfs/Varonis%202019%20Global%20Data%20Risk%20Report.pdf?__hstc=4
5788219.ea1c243f9c6ced0c6a2e66bee594c072.1632484843394.1632484843394.1632484843394.1&__
hssc=45788219.1.1632484843395&__hsfp=1637000307&hsLang=en (analyzing 785 organizations,
and finding “22% of all folders in a company were open to every employee . . . 53% of companies found
over 1,000 sensitive files open to every employee . . . [and] 15% of companies found more than 1 million
folders accessible to every employee”).
10 Id.
11 Data as an asset, KPMG, 2 (2019), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2019/10/dataas-an-asset.pdf (noting data storage costs are near zero which makes data refining paramount in the
modern market).
12
Ellen
Chang, What
Is a
Data
Breach?, EXPERIAN
(Mar. 27, 2009),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-is-a-data-breach (stating once data breaches
occur because of employee negligence or accidents, companies and employees can be discouraged from
“taking the proactive steps necessary to help prevent and plan for a data breach—a phenomenon
known as ‘breach fatigue’”).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Alexander (Sandy) R. Bilus & Erik J. VanderWeyden, After TransUnion, Lower Courts Grapple
with Article III Standing in Data Breach Lawsuits, ABA (Apr. 27, 2022),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/privacy-data-security/articles/2022/aftertransunion-lower-courts-grapple-with-article-iii-standing-data-breach-lawsuits/.
16 U.S. SOC . SEC . ADMIN., Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number, PUB. NO. 05-10064, 12 (2021) https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10064.pdf [hereinafter Identity Theft and Your SSN].
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No circuit court has expressly “foreclosed plaintiffs from establishing standing
based on a risk of future identity theft — even those courts that have declined to find
standing on the facts of a particular case.” 17 The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits have found standing at the pleading stage on a theory of increased risk of
identity theft. 18 Conversely, the Third, Fourth, Eight, and Eleventh Circuits have
refused to find standing on that same theory based on the facts presented before
them.19
This note argues that the new standing test established by the Second Circuit in
McMorris v. Carlos Lopez Association, LLC is flawed because it leaves a majority of
plaintiffs without recourse after a data breach. Part II provides information about the
standing requirement in general and as applied to data breach cases, including an
overview of the differing approaches taken by circuit courts. Part III provides a
detailed overview of the background and analysis employed by the Second Circuit in
McMorris. Part IV outlines the flaws in the Second Circuit’s data breach standing test
and proposes modifications. Part V concludes that the Second Circuit’s test is flawed
because it fails to account for accidental and negligent data breaches.

“Buying personal information from ‘inside’ sources. For example, an identity thief may pay a store
employee for information about you that appears on an application for goods, services, or credit.” Id.
17 McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Ass’n., LLC, 995 F.3d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 2021).
18 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x 384, 387-91 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 691-97 (7th Cir. 2015); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628
F.3d 1139, 1141-43 (9th Cir. 2010); Ree v. Zappos.com, Inc. (In re Zappos.com, Inc.), 888 F.3d 1020,
1023-29 (9th Cir. 2018) (Court found standing where hackers “allegedly stole the names, account
numbers, passwords, email addresses, billing and shipping addresses, telephone numbers, and credit
and debit card information of more than 24 million Zappos customers,” but not social security
numbers, despite no evidence of misuse); AFGE v. OPM (In re OPM), 928 F.3d 42, 50-61 (2019) (Court
found standing where hackers stole the Social Security numbers, fingerprint record, addresses, and
other confidential information of former, present, and prospective government employees despite their
being no evidence of misuse because the targeted attack was likely for the purpose of misusing the
data); Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 625-29 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
19 See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41-46 (3d Cir. 2011) (Court dismissed case when a
hacker hacked defendant’s payroll system and potentially gained access to, read, and copied personal
employee information that consisted of first and last names, social security numbers, bank account
information, and birth dates because allegations of increased risk of identity theft was hypothetical);
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 269-77 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Beck v. Shulkin, 137 S.Ct. 2307, 2307
(2017) (Court dismissed case where hospital lost, likely through theft, a laptop with patient
information that included birth dates, the last four digits of social security numbers, and physical
descriptors because there was no impending threat of harm, no showing of misuse, and no showing of
substantial risk of harm); Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc. (In re SuperValu, Inc.), 870 F.3d 763, 767-74
(8th Cir. 2017) (Court dismissed the case where grocery store was hacked and lost credit and debit
card information because the risk of future harm was too speculative; however, one litigant had
standing because he suffered a fraudulent charge on his card); Tsao v. Captiva MVP Rest. Partners,
Ltd. Liab. Co., 986 F.3d 1332, 1337-45 (11th Cir. 2021) (Court dismissed for lack of standing where
the plaintiff alleged that a restaurant where he shopped at twice was the victim of a data breach which
resulted in the loss of his credit card information because mitigation efforts were not sufficient to
establish injury-in-fact).
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II. BACKGROUND
Digitalization is transforming the way businesses operate, and for many, COVID19 accelerated the process.20 However, this progress is not without setbacks. With a
greater percentage of the workforce working remotely, there is a greater risk of data
breaches.21 The threat, however, does not only come from hackers who steal data with
the intent to sell it. Metadata from 2016 and 2017 shows that around 84% of data
breaches were inadvertent. 22 The breaches were primarily the result of employee
negligence.23 Yet, as it currently stands, it is unlikely that companies will implement
measures to better secure their data unless they are held liable for their employee’s
negligence.
A. Foundation for Article III Standing
Standing is a major hurdle plaintiffs must overcome in a data breach case. 24 To
make the standing requirement even more difficult to satisfy, courts disagree on what
the standing threshold is.25 Although recently, more courts have followed the general
trend towards finding standing at the pleading stage in data breach cases. 26 Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution identifies the standing requirement, 27 which has been

20 Suphachai Chearavanont, How digitization and innovation can make the post-COVID world a
better
place,
WORLD
ECONOMIC
FORUM
(Aug.
11,
2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/08/how-digitization-and-innovation-can-make-the-post-covidworld-a-better-place (stating the pandemic has presented potential for more digitalization of data, and
“the shift to remote working and e-learning will likely extend beyond the COVID-19 pandemic”).
21 Mark Nevins, New Dangers Of Working From Home: Cybersecurity Risks, FORBES (May 19,
2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/hillennevins/2021/05/19/new-dangers-of-working-from-homecybersecurity-risks/?sh=5d3a4e5a22fb. “Companies have had to get better at cybersecurity in our
digital age, but cybersecurity threats have grown significantly with distributed work. Work-fromhome employees are at much greater risk than those in offices.” Id.
22 Mahmood Sher-Jan, Data indicates human error prevailing cause of breaches, incidents, THE
PRIVACY ADVISOR (June 26, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/data-indicates-human-error-prevailingcause-of-breaches-incidents. “Seasoned privacy professionals, however, know that in reality, the
majority of incidents are inadvertent and unintentional, and can be classified as human error. And
these incidents still trigger the same regulatory obligations as intentional and malicious incidents.”
Id.
23 Matthew Stenberg, Negligence Drives 90% of Data Breaches, CYBELANGEL (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://cybelangel.com/blog/negligent-data-breaches (stating common causes of such incidents include:
“An overzealous or new employee foregoing security procedures for simplicity or time saving; an IT
employee involved in shadow IT activities; or a third-party vendor leaving a server open with sensitive
documents exposed”).
24 Gregory Szewczyk & Kelsey Fayer, The Year 2021 in Review: Trends in Data Breach Litigation,
ABA
(Feb.
11,
2022),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/consumer/articles/2022/winter2022-year2021-in-review-trends-in-data-breach-litigation/.
25 Id. (stating “[c]ourts across jurisdictions have appeared to differ as to whether the risk of future
harm constitutes an injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing, but the general trend in recent
years has been a move toward finding standing”).
26 Id.
27 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The United States Constitution provides:
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interpreted by the Supreme Court to limit “the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’
and ‘Controversies.’”28 The Court established that a plaintiff must demonstrate the
existence of three factors to have standing to sue. 29 First, the plaintiff must allege an
injury in fact which is both “concrete and particularized”, and it must also be “actual
or imminent.”30 Second, the plaintiff must show that there is a connection between the
injury and conduct complained of. 31 Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a
favorable court ruling is likely to redress the alleged injury. 32 Injury in fact is the most
difficult factor to prove in a data breach case because plaintiffs regularly claim that
the breach exposes them to the risk of future harm, which courts often find is too
speculative.33
B. Supreme Court Standing Jurisprudence
Injury in fact requires that the plaintiff’s allegations be “certainly impending” and
not simply a potentiality.34 In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the plaintiffs
worked with individuals abroad who were likely to be subject to surveillance under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).35 Specifically, Amnesty International
(“AI”) alleged that its members communicated with foreign individuals who the United
States Government suspected were associated with terrorist organizations or located
in a geographical area that was the focus of the Government’s intelligence efforts.36 AI
argued that they incurred costs and were forced to undertake burdensome measures

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies
between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
28 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). “While the Constitution of the United States
divides all power conferred upon the Federal Government into ‘legislative Powers,’ Art. I, § 1, ‘the
executive Power,’ Art. II, § 1, and ‘the judicial Power,’ Art. III, § 1, it does not attempt to define those
terms.” Id.
29 Id. at 560.
30 Id. (stating an “injury in fact” can be defined as “an invasion of a legally protected interest”).
31 Id. (holding “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of – the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.”).
32 Id. at 561. Therefore, “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will
be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Id.
33
For Consumers, Injury Is Hard to Prove in Data-Breach Cases, CIAB,
https://www.ciab.com/resources/consumers-injury-hard-prove-data-breach-cases/.
34 Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (holding “[the United States Supreme
Court has] repeatedly reiterated that ‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute
injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient”).
35 Id. at 406.
36 Id.
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to protect the confidentiality of its contacts abroad.37 AI alleged the costs sustained
from protecting their clients’ identities to be the injury that was directly traceable to
the government’s conduct.38
The Court noted that it is particularly hesitant to find standing in cases where
the judiciary is asked to review the actions of the other political branches in fields such
as foreign affairs and intelligence gathering. 39 The Court explained that the
“‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that
‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.”40 In Clapper, the Court held
AI’s allegations of surveillance of their contacts to be speculative because no facts were
offered to show that the foreign contacts’ communications were targeted. 41
Alternatively, AI argued that they incurred costs in an effort to minimize the chances
of surveillance.42 However, this argument was dismissed by the Court because AI’s
self-inflicted costs were not the result of the government’s activities, but the result of
their fear of surveillance.43
No precise test exists to determine the boundaries of a case or controversy because
it is a matter of degree.44 The dissent in Clapper argued that the alleged harm was
commonsense, and an understanding of human nature makes this injury sufficiently
likely for Article III standing.45 Specifically, the dissent first pointed to the fact that
AI has, and continues to, engage in electronic communications that FISA permits the
government to intercept.46 Next, the plaintiffs will undoubtedly continue to engage in,
and “the Government has strong motive to listen to,” conversations of the sort at
issue.47 These conversations will include a lawyer’s communications with his clients
that involve confidential matters such as the potential terrorist activity the client is
accused of engaging in.48 Finally, the government has engaged in this sort of behavior

Id. at 407.
Id.
39 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409.
40 Id. at 409 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
41 Id. at 411-12.
42 Id. at 415.
43 Id. at 418.
44 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 423 (the dissent notes “[n]o one here denies that the Government's
interception of a private telephone or e-mail conversation amounts to an injury that is ‘concrete and
particularized’”).
45 Id. at 422 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating “this harm is not ‘speculative.’ Indeed it is as likely
to take place as are most future events that commonsense inference and ordinary knowledge of human
nature tell us will happen. This Court has often found the occurrence of similar future events
sufficiently certain to support standing.”).
46 Id. at 427 (explaining “[t]hese communications include discussions with family members of
those detained at Guantanamo, friends and acquaintances of those persons, and investigators,
experts, and others with knowledge of circumstances related to terrorist activities”).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 427-28. Specifically, the dissent expresses concern that:
37
38

A fair reading of the affidavit of Scott McKay, for example, taken together with
elementary considerations of a lawyer's obligation to his client, indicates that
McKay will engage in conversations that concern what suspected foreign terrorists,
such as his client, have done; in conversations that concern his clients' families,
colleagues, and contacts; in conversations that concern what those persons (or those
connected to them) have said and done, at least in relation to terrorist activities; in
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in the past and has the capacity to conduct the sort of electronic surveillance at issue. 49
In other cases, the dissent noted that the Court found standing when the plaintiff took
steps to mitigate the potential consequences of future injury.50 Therefore, the word
“certainly” does not require absolute certainty in the “certainly impending” standing
requirement.51 Instead, it requires “something more akin to ‘reasonable probability’ or
‘high probability.’”52
The Supreme Court recently addressed the standing issue in Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins.53 In Spokeo, Robins learned that Spokeo, a “people search engine,” created a
profile of Robins for an unknown person based on publicly available information, but
it contained numerous inaccuracies. 54 The Court vacated and remanded the Ninth
Circuit’s determination of standing because the Ninth Circuit only considered whether
the injury was particularized and did not consider whether it was concrete. 55 On
remand, the Ninth Circuit was instructed to consider both factors of the injury-in-fact
prong. 56 An injury is particularized when the plaintiff is affected in a personal or
individual way, which means that the plaintiff actually suffered the harm themselves
as a result of the alleged injury. 57 An injury is concrete when it is real instead of
abstract; monetary loss or physical harm are examples of concrete injuries.58 Concrete
does not require the injury to be tangible; it can be intangible and still be concrete. 59
To determine if an injury is intangible, both history and congressional determination
play an important role.60 On remand, the Ninth Circuit found the alleged injury to be
sufficiently concrete for Article III standing.61
conversations that concern the political, social, and commercial environments in
which the suspected terrorists have lived and worked; and so forth.
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 429.
Id. at 437. The dissent specifically pointed out that “the Court has found that a reasonable
probability of future injury comes accompanied with present injury that takes the form of reasonable
efforts to mitigate the threatened effects of the future injury or to prevent it from occurring.” Id.
51 Id. at 440-41. The dissent noted that it is only a matter of time before the injury occurs.
Specifically, the dissent stated, “the ongoing threat of terrorism means that here the relevant
interceptions will likely take place imminently, if not now.” Id.
52 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 441 (noting the government had motive and capacity to intercept
communications, and no method to avoid interception of electronic communications that includes “a
party who is an American lawyer, journalist, or human rights worker” has been developed).
53 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
54 Id. (stating the service requires that “an individual visits Spokeo’s Web site and inputs a
person’s name, a phone number, or an e-mail address[.] Spokeo conducts a computerized search in a
wide variety of databases and provides information about the subject of the search.”).
55 Id. at 1545.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1548.
58 Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549. (holding “[a] ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must
actually exist.” The standard dictionary definitions of real and abstract are applied to determine
whether an injury is concrete.).
59 Id.
60 Id. (discussing “because that requirement in turn is grounded in historical practice, it is
instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts”).
61 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1111-118 (9th Cir. 2017). “Spokeo published a report
which falsely stated his age, marital status, wealth, education level, and profession, and which
included a photo of a different person.” Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed that Robins’ employment
prospects were potentially harmed.
49
50
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After the McMorris opinion was issued, the Supreme Court decided TransUnion
LLC v. Ramirez, 62 which presents the issue of whether a future risk of harm is
sufficient for Article III standing.63 TransUnion concerned a class action lawsuit where
defendants claimed that TransUnion failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the
accuracy of its credit reports in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 64
Specifically, the defendants alleged that TransUnion issued credit reports to third
parties that erroneously flagged them as potential terrorists. 65 Of the 8,185 class
members, only 1,853 suffered reputational harm, while the credit reports of the
remaining 6,332 class members were not provided to third-parties.66 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the 1,853 class members who had their inaccurate credit reports
disseminated suffered a concrete injury because the dissemination resulted in a harm
to their reputation, which “bears a ‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally
recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.”67 This harm has a
“close relationship” to the tort of defamation.68 The other 6,332 class members did not
suffer a concrete harm because their credit reports were not disseminated, and
“[p]ublication is ‘essential to liability’ in a suit for defamation.” 69 The 6,332 class
members further attempted to argue that they were at substantial risk of future harm;
however, the Court concluded that the risk here was insufficient to give rise to Article
III standing.70

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021).
Id.
64 Id. The Fair Credit Reporting Act imposes the following three requirements that are relevant
to this case:
62
63

First, the Act requires consumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” in consumer reports. §1681e(b).
Second, the Act provides that consumer reporting agencies must, upon request,
disclose to the consumer “[a]ll information in the consumer’s file at the time of the
request.” §1681g(a)(1). Third, the Act compels consumer reporting agencies to
“provide to a consumer, with each written disclosure by the agency to the
consumer,” a “summary of rights” prepared by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau. §1681g(c)(2).
Id. at 2200-02.
Id. at 2200.
67 TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2208-09. “Under longstanding American law, a person is injured
when a defamatory statement ‘that would subject him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule’ is published to
a third party.” Id.
68 Id. at 2209.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 2010-12 (stating “plaintiffs [did not] present evidence that the class members were
independently harmed by their exposure to the risk itself—that is, that they suffered some other
injury (such as an emotional injury) from the mere risk that their credit reports would be provided to
third-party businesses”).
65
66
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C. Circuit Courts’ Interpretation of Standing Requirements in Data Breach Cases
Several circuits have addressed the issue of data breaches, but reached differing
conclusions based on the facts alleged.71 The D.C. Circuit found standing where an
unknown intruder hacked into twenty-two servers of CareFirst, a health insurance
company, and obtained consumer’s personal information, including social security
numbers and email addresses.72 The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal
of the case for a lack of standing because an unauthorized party gained access to
CareFirst’s servers and stole personal information.73 It presumably did so for purposes
of identity theft or credit theft.74 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that, unlike in Clapper, a
long sequence of uncertain events involving multiple parties does not have to occur for
the plaintiff to suffer a harm like credit fraud or identity theft.75 Since the data was
stolen, it is plausible to infer that the hackers stole the data for malicious reasons.76
The Sixth Circuit addressed standing in the data breach context after Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company was hacked and lost the personal information, including
social security numbers and birth dates, of approximately 1.1 million consumers. 77
Nationwide informed plaintiffs of the breach and offered one year of free credit
monitoring and identity-fraud protection through a third-party vendor. 78 Plaintiffs
alleged that they would continue to suffer financial harm resulting from the breach by
maintaining continued credit and identity-fraud monitoring and paying for all
associated expenses.79 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the substantial risk of harm
and the reasonable mitigation costs incurred are sufficient to establish Article III
standing.80 The key here is the fact that the data was stolen as part of a targeted
attack, instead of an accidental breach, because hackers stole data to use it for
fraudulent purposes.81
The Seventh Circuit addressed Article III standing in a data breach case after
luxury department store Neiman Marcus was hacked in 2013. 82 It learned that
fraudulent charges had been made on their client’s debit and credit cards in December
2013.83 On January 10, 2014, Neiman Marcus announced that it was the victim of a
cyberattack that had occurred between July and October 2013 and around 350,000
cards have been exposed. 84 Some clients filed a class action, but their suit was
71 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 300 (noting that “requiring plaintiffs to allege that they have already
suffered identity theft or fraud as the result of a data breach would seem to run afoul of the Supreme
Court's recognition that ‘[a]n allegation of future injury may suffice’ to establish Article III standing”).
72 Attias, 865 F.3d at 623-24 (stating plaintiffs “raised eleven different state-law causes of action,
including breach of contract, negligence, and violation of various state consumer-protection statutes”).
73 Id. at 628-29.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 629.
76 Id. at 628.
77 Galaria, 663 F. App'x at 386 (noting the plaintiffs alleged “invasion of privacy, negligence,
bailment, and violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act”).
78 Id.
79 Id. 387-88.
80 Id. at 388.
81 Id.
82 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 689-90.
83 Id. at 690.
84 Id.
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dismissed because the district court found that they lacked standing. 85 9,200
individuals suffered fraudulent charges as of the lawsuit, but all of them were
reimbursed. 86 The Seventh Circuit recognized that a substantial risk of harm can
suffice to establish Article III standing.87 Article III standing was present because the
plaintiffs must continue to take steps to protect their data, and it stands to reason that
the hackers stole the information, “sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or
assume those consumers' identities.”88

III. THE CASE
McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Assocs., LLC concerns the appeal of Devonne
McMorris who had her data breach claim dismissed because she and her co-plaintiffs
failed to “allege an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing.”89
A. The Facts of the Case
In June 2018, Carlos Lopez & Associates, LLP ("CLA") experienced a data breach,
when an employee accidentally emailed a spreadsheet containing sensitive employee
information to the company’s then-current employees. 90 The spreadsheet contained
“Social Security numbers, home addresses, dates of birth, telephone numbers,
educational degrees, and dates of hire” of 130 then-current and past employees.91 It
took CLA two weeks to instruct its then-current employees to resolve the accidental
data breach, but CLA did not contact any former employees regarding the breach nor
take any other steps to mitigate the breach.92
B. Procedural History
The Plaintiffs, Robin Steven, Sean Mungin, and Devonne McMorris, filed a classaction lawsuit against CLA and Carlos Lopez, CLA’s principal.93 The chief allegation
was that CLA breached its duty to protect confidential employee information.94 The
plaintiffs argued that, despite not yet being the victims of fraud or identity theft, they
Id.
Id. at 692.
87 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
88 Id. at 693.
89 McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Ass’n., LLC, 995 F.3d 295, 297 (2d Cir. 2021).
90 Id. at 297-98.
91 Id. at 298.
92 Id.
93 Id. (stating the complaint included counts for “state-law claims for negligence, negligence per
se, and statutory consumer protection violations on behalf of classes in California, Florida, Texas,
Maine, New Jersey, and New York”).
94 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 298 (stating that specifically, plaintiffs alleged CLA “‘breached its duty
to protect and safeguard [their] personal information and to take reasonable steps to contain the
damage caused where such information was compromised’”).
85
86
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were “‘at imminent risk of suffering identity theft’ and becoming the victims of
‘unknown but certainly impending future crimes.’”95 Plaintiffs were also forced to take
preventative measures such as purchasing identity theft protection services, credit
monitoring services, and cancelling their credit cards.96
CLA filed a motion to dismiss with the district court, but before a ruling was
issued, the parties reached a settlement and asked the district court to certify it. 97
Prior to the fairness hearing, the district court ordered, sua sponte, a briefing to
determine whether plaintiffs had Article III standing.98 During the fairness hearing,
the district court informed the parties about its preliminary conclusion that plaintiffs
lacked Article III standing because they failed to allege a concrete and particularized
injury that was certainly impending.99 The district court pointed to the fact that none
of the class members alleged that their identity was actually stolen or misused.100
Furthermore, the district court noted the dissemination of plaintiffs’ personal
information was not the result of an intentional act, or a criminal attempt to hack CLA,
which could lead to the inference that the hacker intended to retain and misuse the
data.101 The essence of the case was that defendants failed to exercise sufficient care to
protect the confidential data from being disseminated among the company’s
employees.102 On November 22, 2019, the district court issued its opinion, refusing to
certify the settlement and dismissing the case. 103 McMorris appealed the district
court’s decision without the other plaintiffs in the class.104
C. The Second Circuit’s Analysis
McMorris is the first case where the Second Circuit addressed whether a plaintiff
has standing to sue based on a theory of future risk of identity theft or fraud resulting
from the inadvertent disclosure of the plaintiff’s personal data. 105 The Second Circuit
identified a few factors to determine whether a plaintiff has Article III standing to sue
after a data breach including:
(1) whether the plaintiffs' data has been exposed as the result of a
targeted attempt to obtain that data; (2) whether any portion of the
dataset has already been misused, even if the plaintiffs themselves
have not yet experienced identity theft or fraud; and (3) whether the
type of data that has been exposed is sensitive such that there is a high
risk of identity theft or fraud.106
Id.
Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 298 (the district court holding it is hard to call this case a data breach
case because the data was misplaced by a CLA employee instead of being acquired by a third-party).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 298-99.
102 Id. at 299.
103 Id.
104 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 299.
105 Id. at 300.
106 Id. at 303.
95
96
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These factors are highly relevant but non-exhaustive. 107 In applying the facts, the
Second Circuit found that McMorris did not have Article III standing to sue. 108
Regarding the first factor, plaintiffs did not allege that their data was lost because of
an intentional attack or obtained by a third party outside their workplace.109 While the
plaintiffs did allege that their personal information was disclosed without
authorization to CLA employees, there was no allegation that anyone outside the
company gained access to that information.110 The Second Circuit also noted that the
plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient to establish a substantial risk of future identity
theft because it would require the assumption that then-current CLA employees would
either misuse the data themselves or provide it to a malicious third party.111
The plaintiffs also did not allege that their data was misused because of the
accidental disclosure. 112 While plaintiffs do not need to show that they experienced
actual identity theft or fraud, they must at least allege facts that suggest their personal
information might be misused in some form.113 The plaintiffs thus failed to satisfy the
second prong of the test. 114 Regarding the third factor, the information stolen was
substantial.115 However, the Second Circuit reasoned that absent evidence of actual
misuse, the disclosure of highly sensitive information is not sufficient.116
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Limitations of the “Increased Risk of Identity Theft” Framework
Data breach cases are regularly brought under the theory that the plaintiff faces
an increased risk of future identity theft.117 Generally, the plaintiff will invest time and
money to mitigate that risk, such as through purchasing identity theft services, and
will request compensation for the time and money spent. 118 However, the Supreme
Court warns that plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by inflicting harm on
themselves. 119 The question then becomes whether taking steps to mitigate the
chances of personally identifiable information being misused constitutes
manufacturing standing.
Id.
Id.
109 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 303.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 304 (stating “we would have to assume that then-current employees of CLA . . . would
either misuse the data themselves or leak or expose the spreadsheet containing Plaintiffs' PII to a
malicious third party, and, if the latter, that such a third party would then misuse Plaintiffs' PII”).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 304.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 300.
118 Bohnak v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8256, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17,
2022).
119 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416.
107
108
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In an effort to answer this question, various circuit courts have considered similar
factors in the data breach context, and the Second Circuit composed its non-exhaustive,
three-part test using the most common of these factors. 120 The problem with the
“increased risk of identity theft” framework is that it limits plaintiffs’ ability to litigate
their case beyond the pleading stage in circumstances where sensitive data, like Social
Security numbers, is negligently leaked. Absent a breach caused by a malicious third
party or evidence of data misuse, the plaintiff has a slim chance, if any, chance of
pursuing their case. This presents a series of problems because most data breaches are
the result of negligence.121 The Second Circuit is the first circuit to clearly crystalize
the “increased risk of identity theft” framework,122 but as the law develops, courts may
shift away from such stringent application of that standard.
TransUnion LLC, decided after McMorris, offers some guidance in shifting
away from the “increased risk of identity theft” framework. In that case, the Supreme
Court held that “plaintiffs [whose inaccurate credit reports were not disseminated] did
not demonstrate that the risk of future harm materialized.”123 However, the Court in
TransUnion LLC did acknowledge that the dissemination of the inaccurate credit
reports was a concrete harm because it bore resemblance to the tort of defamation. 124
Whereas, data breach cases typically begin when the personally identifiable
information is disseminated. McMorris had her personally identifiable information
disseminated to then-current employees of CLA. 125 While there was no evidence of
harm, McMorris and the other victims of the data breach would have almost certainly
preferred their personal information remain confidential. TransUnion LLC suggests
that the dissemination of private information may be sufficient to confer standing
where the “asserted harm has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally recognized
as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.”126 In the future, litigants suing
after a data breach may find some success by alleging that a data breach bears a “close
relationship” to a harm recognized in American courts, such as, but not limited to,
negligence, breach of an implied contract, or invasion of privacy. Such claims would
likely bear close resemblance to the defamation argument in TransUnion LLC.
B. The Second Circuit’s Data Breach Standing Test
1. The First Factor: How was the Data Exposed?
The first factor of the McMorris test asks “whether the plaintiffs' data has been
exposed as the result of a targeted attempt to obtain that data[.]” 127 Courts that find

Id. at 301-03.
Reinicke, supra note 8.
122 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 303-04.
123 TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2211.
124 Id. at 2208-09.
125 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 298.
126 TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2200.
127 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 299. The Second Circuit noted that no one outside CLA is alleged to
have acquired the information because the leak was accidental; thus, the breach is “[f]ar from being a
120
121
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standing in a data breach case usually do so in part because the data was stolen as
part of a malicious attack.128 The Seventh Circuit noted in Remijas that hackers steal
data to misuse it. 129 This first element of the test is often considered the most
important.130 It has the power to make or break a case.131 However, it is important to
consider whether the accidental dissemination of a person’s personally identifiable
information will prompt that person to take action to protect their data, and what the
expenses associated with those steps are. According to most circuit courts, these
questions are incompatible with the Supreme Court’s prohibition against finding
standing based on the possibility or reasonable likelihood of future injury. 132 Likewise,
it clashes with the prohibition against plaintiffs inflicting harm on themselves to
manufacture standing.133 However, individuals who seek to protect their data are not
doing so as a self-infliction of harm. Rather, it is a natural response to a data breach.
Essentially, the harm is the need to protect the data that was leaked, and the effort to
do so comes at a cost to the plaintiff.
The dissent in Clapper noted that the interception by the government of the
plaintiffs’ communications “is as likely to take place as are most future events that
commonsense inference and ordinary knowledge of human nature tell us will
happen.” 134 This standard makes more sense in the data breach context because the
‘sophisticated’ or ‘malicious’ cyberattack ‘carried out to obtain sensitive information for improper
use[.]’” Id.
128 See AFGE, 928 F.3d at 56 (noting “hackers stole Social Security numbers, birth dates,
fingerprints, and addresses, among other sensitive personal information. It hardly takes a criminal
mastermind to imagine how such information could be used to commit identity theft”); see also
Alleruzzo, 870 F.3d at 772 (stating the “[d]efendants failed to secure customer Card Information on
their network; their network was subsequently hacked; customer Card Information was stolen by the
hackers; and Holmes became the victim of identity theft after the data breaches”); Attias, 865 F.3d at
629 (where “a substantial risk of harm exists already, simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of
the data that the plaintiffs allege was taken”); Galaria, 663 F. App'x at 390 (stating that but for
Nationwide's allegedly lax security, the hackers would not have been able to steal Plaintiffs' data.
These allegations meet the threshold for Article III traceability, which requires "more than
speculative but less than but-for" causation”); Ree, 888 F.3d at 1027 (stating “[a]lthough there is no
allegation in this case that the stolen information included social security numbers, as there was in
Krottner, the information taken in the data breach still gave hackers the means to commit fraud or
identity theft”).
129 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. “Why else would hackers break into a store's database and steal
consumers' private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make
fraudulent charges or assume those consumers' identities.” Id.
130 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 301. “First, and most importantly, our sister circuits have consistently
considered whether the data at issue has been compromised as the result of a targeted attack intended
to obtain the plaintiffs' data.” Id.
131 Id. (holding “[w]here plaintiffs fail to present evidence or make any allegations that an
unauthorized third party purposefully obtained the plaintiffs' data, courts have regularly held that
the risk of future identity theft is too speculative to support Article III standing”).
132 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409-10.
133 Id. at 416.
134 Id. at 422 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer discusses facts that, with commonsense
inferences, demonstrate that the Government intercepted the plaintiff’s communications:
First, the plaintiffs have engaged, and continue to engage, in electronic
communications of a kind that the 2008 amendment, but not the prior Act,
authorizes the Government to intercept. . . . Second, the plaintiffs have a strong
motive to engage in, and the Government has a strong motive to listen to,
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stakes do not generally involve national security or the separation of powers. 135 The
adverse impact of a data breach primarily affects the ordinary person whose data was
exposed. Commonsense inference and ordinary human knowledge tell us that
individuals who have their data exposed will seek to protect it. The extent of the harm
depends on the type of data exposed, as the third factor of the McMorris test recognizes,
because people will be more inclined to pay to protect sensitive data like Social Security
numbers. Yet, despite progress in this field, negligent parties are yet to be held
accountable.
Another issue with finding standing primarily when the breach is the result of a
targeted attack is the fact that most breaches occur because of employee negligence. 136
According to the Second Circuit, most of the victims of such a breach have no chance
at any sort of relief, like having the company pay for monitoring services, because their
harm is too speculative. 137 Clapper also noted that parties cannot manufacture
standing by inflicting harm on themselves.138 In a data breach case, the dissemination
of personal information is the injury, and it should be sufficient to confer standing. Due
to the cost of litigation, most data breach cases are likely to get settled relatively
quickly to avoid unnecessary expenses and costs.139 In McMorris, the parties reached
a settlement agreement and asked the district court to approve it, but the district court
conversations of the kind described.... At the same time, the Government has a
strong motive to conduct surveillance of conversations that contain material of this
kind. . . . Third, the Government's past behavior shows that it has sought, and
hence will in all likelihood continue to seek, information about alleged terrorists
and detainees through means that include surveillance of electronic
communications. . . . Fourth, the Government has the capacity to conduct electronic
surveillance of the kind at issue. To some degree this capacity rests upon technology
available to the Government.
135 Id. at 402-06 (displaying the statute in question authorized the surveillance of individuals
located outside the United States who were suspected of being threats to national security).
136 Sher-Jan, supra note 22 (noting most data breaches are inadvertent but still should be
followed by an investigation into the breach to prevent future incidents).
137 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 301.
138 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416 (stating parties “cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting
harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending”).
139 Kristen L. Burge, Your Data Was Stolen, But Not Your Identity (Yet), ABA (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/featuredarticles/2018/your-data-was-stolen-not-your-identity-yet/. The author utilized the expertise of Tyler
G. Newby, cochair of the ABA Section of Litigation’s Privacy & Data Security Committee, and Fabrice
N. Vincent, cochair of the Section’s Class Actions & Derivative Suits Committee, and noted:

But ‘reality is that most, if not all, of these cases settle before trial . . . Newby
concedes. Drawing on public policy, Vincent advocates the nature of the data
breached should inform damages and the remedy, not dictate access to the courts.
‘Only such a system will properly motivate the data holder to take the steps
necessary to prevent data breaches as well as to offer real solutions to data breaches
that have already occurred,’ suggests Vincent. ‘In a perfect world, all compromised
persons would have standing to sue, and the severity of the breach, e.g., the
importance of the compromised data and likelihood or actuality of ensuing further
harm, would inform the magnitude of recoverable damages/remedy analysis
(instead of a harsh standing rule that can unfairly bar claims in the first instance),’
maintains Vincent.
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refused sua sponte. 140 In other words, the district court proactively denied relief to the
plaintiffs even though they managed to settle the case before any lengthy and
expensive litigation.
2. The Second Factor: What was Done with the Data?
The second factor of the McMorris test asks “whether any portion of the dataset
has already been misused, even if the plaintiffs themselves have not yet experienced
identity theft or fraud[.]”141 The Second Circuit reasoned that evidence of misuse is not
a necessary component of standing in a data breach case. 142 However, the Second
Circuit also recognized that the risk of identity theft is greater if at least one plaintiff
had their compromised data misused.143 Evidence of misuse is an important element
in a data breach standing test because if one plaintiff’s data was misused, another’s
data can be misused. The Seventh Circuit reasoned in Remijas that if hackers steal
data, they plan to misuse it.144 An offshoot to this argument is that if someone misuses
another’s accidentally leaked data, they will likely misuse the data of other’s affected
by the breach. Even if the data was not misused, that does not mean the plaintiff has
not suffered a harm simply by having their data exposed because the plaintiff may
reasonably seek to avoid misuse through monitoring services. This proposition is
implicit in the Second Circuit’s recognition that misuse is not required for standing.
3. The Third Factor: The Nature of the Data
The third factor of the McMorris test asks, “whether the type of data that has been
exposed is sensitive such that there is a high risk of identity theft or fraud.” 145 If an
individual’s Social Security number is breached, the risk is much greater than when
credit card information is leaked. Credit cards can easily be cancelled, but social
security numbers cannot easily be replaced, and the Social Security Administration is
slow to resolve the issue. 146 Hence, individuals cannot ignore or easily resolve the
breach of their social security number and are often forced to purchase identity
Id. at 298.
McMorris, 995 F.3d at 303. Misuse, while not necessary to show standing in a data breach
case, helps demonstrate that the plaintiff faces a greater risk of identity theft and/or fraud. Plaintiffs
did not allege misuse in this case. Id.
142 Id. at 301.
143 Id. (holding “courts have been more likely to conclude that plaintiffs have established a
substantial risk of future injury where they can show that at least some part of the compromised
dataset has been misused — even if plaintiffs' particular data subject to the same disclosure incident
has not yet been affected”).
144 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
145 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 299. The Second Circuit noted that “the dissemination of high-risk
information such as Social Security numbers and dates of birth — especially when accompanied by
victims' names — makes it more likely that those victims will be subject to future identity theft or
fraud.” Id.
146 Identity Theft and Your SSN, supra note 16, at 3. “If someone has misused your Social Security
number or other personal information to create credit or other problems for you, Social Security can’t
resolve these problems. But there are several things you should do.” Id.
140
141
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protection. Naturally, plaintiffs’ reactions to data breaches will vary based on the type
of data exposed. The Second Circuit recognized in McMorris that the information that
was leaked placed the plaintiffs at a significant risk of identity theft or fraud. 147 The
leaked information, among other things, consisted of social security numbers. Despite
this, the Second Circuit refused to acknowledge that plaintiffs will reasonably seek to
protect the sensitive data that was disseminated, irrespective of the cause of the
breach.148
The circulation of information that can easily and inexpensively be protected, such
as credit card information,149 should not give rise to standing, but the circulation of
sensitive information should be sufficient to grant the plaintiff standing because of the
devastating consequences.150 Thus, the type of information stolen or circulated should
be a key factor in determining whether to grant standing.

C. The Rise of Digitalization Will Result in More Data Breaches
The McMorris test fails to account for the fact that plaintiffs will be left without
recourse as data becomes one of the most valuable commodities in a continually
digitalized economy because companies are not adequately prepared to safeguard their

McMorris, 995 F.3d at 305.
Id. at 304.
149
Lost or Stolen Credit, ATM, and Debit Cards, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/lost-or-stolen-credit-atm-debitcards#:~:text=Federal%20law%20already%20protects%20you,easy%20for%20you%20to%20report
(last visited Dec. 10, 2021). People have a lot of protection when their debit or credit cards are lost or
stolen, and the process to freeze a debit or credit account is very simple:
147
148

If your credit, ATM, or debit card is lost or stolen, federal law limits your liability
for charges made without your permission, but your protection depends on the type
of card — and when you report the loss. It’s important to act fast. If you wait until
someone uses your card without permission, you may have to pay some or all of
those charges. If someone uses your ATM or debit card before you report it lost or
stolen, what you owe depends on how quickly you report it.
150 Gayle Sato, The Unexpected Costs of Identity Theft, E XPERIAN (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-are-unexpected-costs-of-identity-theft.
The
author discussed the various consequences that arise when a person’s identity is stolen:

Although debit and credit card issuers limit your liability for fraudulent charges,
you could still be on the hook for the loss if you don't report phony charges in time.
And since time is money, the hours you spend tracking, reporting and resolving the
effects of identity theft are also a significant loss. According to a report from the
SANS Institute, it takes an average of six months and roughly 200 hours of work
to recover your identity after it's been compromised. It may even cause you to have
to take time off from your job. . . . Having your identity stolen can be traumatic. In
a survey of consumers who experienced identity crime, the Identity Theft Resource
Center found that 77% reported increased stress levels and 55% experienced fatigue
or decreased energy. Additionally, respondents said they had trust issues with
friends and family, and problems with their employers or schools.
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data. 151 Companies are incorporating electronic forms of data storage at an
increasingly fast pace.152 As a result, the use of data is leading to more data breaches,
both malicious and unintentional.153 With the loss of data, like social security numbers,
employees and consumers will naturally seek to protect their exposed information even
if it was not maliciously stolen or misused.154 The courts’ interpretation of standing
jurisprudence does not account for the realities of the modern economy. Because, courts
fail to recognize that a data breach caused by negligence is an injury in itself, once
private data is disseminated, it cannot be undone. 155 Another major, related cause is
the failure of companies to incorporate reasonable safeguards to protect their data and
restrict access.156 Considering the impact of COVID-19 on the economy, the threat of
data breaches is greater, and the consequences to the victims more devastating.157
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, more companies have allowed their employees to
work remotely which increases the risk of data breaches. 158 This trend will likely
continue well into the future. 159 Companies are slow to implement cybersecurity
measures.160 Because employee negligence is already a key driver of data breaches, 161
the problem will only get worse as companies continue to promote remote work unless
companies also invest in data protection.162 The current standing jurisprudence for
data breach cases offers little relief to many individuals who have had their data
exposed due to negligence because courts are only willing to find standing under
limited circumstances, such as the loss of data to hackers.163 Therefore, companies
have little incentive to protect their data with reasonable safeguards. Some states have
addressed the problem of data breaches by passing statutes,164 but generally, courts
151 Data as an asset, supra note 11. “Only 18 percent of organizations feel they are very or
extremely effective at maintaining an enterprisewide data management strategy.” Id.
152 Ahlstrom, supra note 1. “Data serves as the critical energy source of a business, so addressing
data quality and governance offers a major opportunity for generating a competitive advantage.
Organizations that capitalize on it early will differentiate themselves and pull out in front as market
leaders.” Id.
153 Sher-Jan, supra note 22.
154 Identity Theft and Your SSN, supra note 16, at 1-2.
155 Stenberg, supra note 23 (noting breaches occur because employees either fail to take
reasonable precautions to protect data or abuse poor company security measures to their advantage).
156 2019 VARONIS GLOBAL DATA RISK REPORT, supra note 9.
157 Booth, supra note 3.
158 Chearavanont, supra note 20.
159 Id.
160 Stefan Leipold, Cybersecurity Policies In The Age Of Remote Work, FORBES (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinesscouncil/2021/03/15/cybersecurity-policies-in-the-age-ofremote-work/?sh=1b0533694442 (stating “organizations often remain unaware of the cybersecurity
implications of the remote workforce. The new way of working expands the potential for cybersecurity
threats with new vulnerabilities surrounding every employee working from home or a local cafe.”).
161 Reinicke, supra note 8. “Employee negligence is the main cause of data breaches . . . The report
found that 47 percent of business leaders said human error such as accidental loss of a device or
document by an employee had caused a data breach at their organization.” Id.
162 Ritesh, supra note 7 (noting that many companies are at a heightened risk of data breaches
because they did not take cybersecurity considerations into account in the early stages of their
software development).
163 AFGE, 928 F.3d at 50-61; Attias, 865 F.3d at 625-29; Galaria, 663 F. App'x at 387-91; Krottner,
628 F.3d at 1141-43; Ree, 888 F.3d at 1023-29; Remijas, 794 F.3d at 691-97.
164 Joseph J. Lazzarotti, et al., California May Lower the Standing Threshold in Data Breach
Litigation, WORKPLACE PRIVACY, DATA MANAGEMENT & SECURITY REPORT (July 11, 2018),
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are left to establish their own standards. However, courts have remained hesitant to
find standing based solely on the fact that sensitive data was leaked.
A major issue is that courts have trouble applying standing principles to data
breach cases.165 The injury-in-fact prong is particularly difficult to meet and is often
the main point of contention in a data breach case. 166 Therefore, the question often
comes down to whether the plaintiff can establish that the injury is both particularized
and concrete and either actual or imminent.167 This is further complicated by courts’
determination that plaintiffs cannot establish standing by inflicting harm on
themselves by taking steps to avoid a potential injury in the future. 168 The Supreme
Court has offered some guidance in this field169 but has yet to grant certiorari to a case
concerning data breach standing. This has proven to be problematic because courts’
take a very conservative approach in granting standing, leaving many plaintiffs
without recourse.
The particularized element requires that the injury affect the plaintiff in a
personal and individualized way.170 An injury is concrete when it actually exists; in
other words, the injury must be real as opposed to abstract. 171 In the data breach
context, courts agree that identity theft is a concrete and particularized injury. 172
However, oftentimes, plaintiffs sue before falling victim to identity theft. Courts are
generally more willing to find a data breach to be both concrete and particularized
when it results from a targeted attack, and when the data taken is sensitive, like a
social security number.173 However, digitalization is bound to result in more beaches.
Based on current trends, more people will lose their data through the negligence of
companies and their employees.174 However, if the breach was not caused by a targeted
attack, courts will likely deny relief. Such an approach is a major setback to the
expectation that people’s data will be protected when they share it with another
organization as part of a contractual or transactional agreement.

https://www.workplaceprivacyreport.com/2018/07/articles/consumer-privacy/california-may-lowerthe-standing-threshold-in-data-breach-litigation/ (discussing California passed a bill that permits
consumers, defined as someone who provides personal information to purchase or lease a product or
obtain a service, to sue for breach of personal information without showing actual injury. A breach is
defined as “‘unauthorized access, use, modification, or disclosure of personal information.’”).
165 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 300 (noting no court has explicitly foreclosed the possibility of finding
standing on a theory of increased risk of future identity theft).
166 Id.
167 Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (holding there is no standing unless the injury is both
particularized and concrete).
168 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 419.
169 Id. at 409-14 (noting “speculative chain of possibilities does not establish that [an] injury based
on [the] potential” of future injury will occur); Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (defining what a
particularized and concrete injury is).
170 Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
171 Id.
172 AFGE, 928 F.3d at 55 (stating “the loss of a constitutionally protected privacy interest itself
would qualify as a concrete, particularized, and actual injury in fact. And the ongoing and substantial
threat to that privacy interest would be a concrete, particularized, and imminent injury in fact.”).
173 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 301-04 (noting sister circuits have consistently considered whether the
breach was caused by a targeted attack).
174 Sher-Jan, supra note 22.
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Courts also require that the injury be actual or imminent for the injury-in-fact
prong to be met.175 In the preeminent Supreme Court case on standing, Clapper, the
analysis was particularly stringent because it concerned national security and the
separation of powers. 176 The statute in Clapper permitted government surveillance
when the target was either a foreign power or agent.177 Therefore, the Court was more
deferential to the government considering the interests at stake and concern for
ensuring the separation of powers. Because data breach cases generally do not involve
issues of national security, the analysis is not likely to be as stringent. Data breach
cases will come down to how certain future identity theft is. However, given the modern
importance of data, the cause of action should not be so limited. When data is
impermissibly disseminated, the burden should shift to the negligent party to mitigate
the damage.
V. CONCLUSION
Data breaches will continue to increase in frequency as businesses and the
economy continue to digitalize. 178 The new non-exhaustive, 3-prong data breach
standing test developed by the Second Circuit offers some guidance, but it still leaves
many victims of data breaches without recourse. 179 The Second Circuit’s test is the
most comprehensive attempt at clarifying the standing requirement in a data breach
case and will provide guidance for future litigants.180 However, the test is not without
its flaws, and courts should continue to refine it to eventually offer relief to victims of
data breaches caused by negligence.
To create the test, the Second Circuit analyzed the rationales of other circuits and
found that a plaintiff generally has no standing in a situation where the data breach
175 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (noting imminence is an elastic concept but requires the injury to be
certainly impending).
176 Ree, 888 F.3d at 1026.
177 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 403.
178 Ritesh, supra note 7.
179 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 301 (noting courts routinely find the injury to be too speculative where
the data breach was not the result of a targeted attack).
180 Phillip N. Yannella, Second Circuit ruling clarifies when data breach plaintiffs have
adequately pleaded Article III standing, CONSUMER FINANCE MONITOR (May 7, 2021),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2021/05/07/second-circuit-ruling-clarifies-when-databreach-plaintiffs-have-adequately-pleaded-article-iii-standing. The author recognized the importance
of the Second Circuit’s data breach standing test:

McMorris may prove to be a landmark opinion. The Second Circuit’s opinion is the
first to set forth a list of factors for courts to assess when determining whether there
is a substantial risk of identity theft and it is likely that litigants, and potentially
other courts, will cite the McMorris factors in future cases. Beyond the substantial
risk test, plaintiffs and defendants will likely cite different aspects of the Second
Circuit’s opinion to advance their arguments. Data breach plaintiffs will cite
McMorris for the proposition that fear of future identity theft can establish
standing, and to argue that there is not a circuit court split on this issue.
Defendants on the other hand will cite the Second Circuit’s ruling that out of pocket
expenses to guard against identify theft does not automatically create standing.
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was accidental. 181 Courts justify this view by claiming that criminals steal data to
misuse it.182 Thus, accidental or negligent breaches are insufficient to show harm. 183
Denying standing to victims of accidental and negligent breaches only incentivizes
companies to ignore cybersecurity in favor of cutting costs.184 Fortunately, the Supreme
Court has offered some guidance in TransUnion LLC.185 Future litigants will want to
attempt to argue that a data breach “bears a close relationship to a harm traditionally
recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.”186 This argument can
potentially take many forms, ultimately depending on the facts of each case, and how
those facts relate to a harm traditionally recognized by American courts.
Furthermore, denying standing when the data breach was caused by an accident
or negligence ignores how victims will react to a data breach. Victims of data breaches
will be prompted to protect their data at significant expense to themselves, and victims
will be unable to secure any sort of compensation for their loss. Going forward, courts
will have to consider how to handle accidental and negligent breaches. While the
Second Circuit’s test offers a model for other courts to develop a more comprehensive
test, it is not sufficient for modern realities.

McMorris, 995 F.3d at 301-3.
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
183 McMorris, 995 F.3d at 304 (holding “[a]ccordingly, we conclude that the sensitive nature of
McMorris's internally disclosed PII, by itself, does not demonstrate that she is at a substantial risk of
future identity theft or fraud”).
184
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., CYBERSECURITY PROGRAM BEST PRACTICES 4,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/key-topics/retirement-benefits/cybersecurity/bestpractices.pdf. “Employees are often an organization’s weakest link for cybersecurity. A comprehensive
cybersecurity security awareness program sets clear cybersecurity expectations for all employees and
educates everyone to recognize attack vectors, help prevent cyber-related incidents, and respond to a
potential threat.” Id.
185 TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2209.
186 Id.
181
182

